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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
CASE NO. 168~

vs.

/&8"56

DELBERT DEAN LODDY,
Defendant-Respondent.
* * * *

*

* * * * * * *

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
The State of Utah

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is a criminal prosecution which was initiated
in Tooele County and had proceeded through preliminary examination in the Sixth Circuit Court and was pending for
trial in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County
on an Information filed by the Tooele County Attorney, charging
the defendant with Theft, a Felony of the Second Degree in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.

The incident giving rise to the

prosecution occurred on September 29, 1975 near Delle in
Tooele County.
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss whj_ch was heard before
the Third District Court in and for Tooele County with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-1Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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David B. Dee, District Judge presiding on December 13, 1979.
After hearing arguments on the Motion to Dismiss the Court
made its Order granting defendant's motion and dismissing
the Information with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Pursuant to its right to appeal granted by Section
77-39-4

(9), appellant requests that the Order of Dismissal

be reversed and the Information be reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 29, 1975 an incident involving a theft of
copper wire belonging to Mountain Bell Telephone Co., occurred
near Delle in Tooele County.

On September 30, 1975 William

Warren Holton was arrested and charged in a Complaint filed
in Tooele City Court with the conunission of the theft.

On

April 11, 1978, after a series of continuances, some of
which occurred because Mr. Holton failed to appear and his
whereabouts were unknown, Mr. Holton appeared in the Sixth
Circuit Court for a preliminary examination.

Pursuant to a

negotiated plea, the State moved to amend the Complaint to
charge Attempted Theft, a Felony of the Third Degree.

This

Motion was granted and Mr. Holton was bound over to appear
in District Court that same day.

Mr. Holton appeared in

District Court and entered a plea of guilty to the Information
filed charging him with Attempted Theft, a Third Degree
Felony.

on April 13, 1978 Mr. Holton gave a statement to the

Tooele county Sheriff in which he implicated the defendant

-2-
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herein, Delbert Dean Loddy, in the offense which had occurred on
September 29, 1975.

After the statement was transcribed, a

Complaint was filed in the Tooele City Court on June 15,
1978 charging Delbert Dean Loddy with the theft which had
occurred on September 29, 1975 and a warrant for Mr. Loddy's
arrest was issued.

Mr. Loddy was arrested in Wyoming in

June, 1979 and waived extradition from Campbell County,
Wyoming on June 22, 1979.

From that date on, there were a

number of delays and continuances of the trial, all at the
defendant's request, until the date the Motion to Dismiss
was heard and the Order of Dismissal was entered, which
resulted in this appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Order dismissing the Information with

prejudice set forth the reasons therefore with sufficient
specificity?
2.

Whether the defendant's right to Due Process of Law

under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
has been violated?
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ORDER OF THE DISTRICT COURT DISMISSING
THE INFORMATION WITH PREJUDICE DID NOT SET
FORTH THE REASONS FOR THE DISMISSAL WITH
SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY
In this case after listening to the arguments of counsel
the District Court Judge made the following order;
there's a question of delay within delay.
-3-
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Well,

In any event the
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Court having heard the Motion, arguments and reviewed the
file makes a determination.

The Motion to Dismiss is granted

with prejudice.'' (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to 9ismiss,
pages 10-11).

In the written Order of Dismissal, which the

District Judge signed, the following language appears, "Based
upon the pleadings and documents in the file and the Affidavit
of Robert Van Seiver and the Court having heard the arguments
of counsel, it is hereby ordered that the Information in the
above entitled case be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice."
(Order of Dismissal).
Section 77-51-4, U.C.A., 1953, as amended, provides:
The Court may, either of its own motion or upon the
application of the County Attorney, in furtherance of justice
order an action, information or indictment to be dismissed.
The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order
entered upon the minutes.
In Salt Lake City v. Hanson, 19 Utah 2d 32, 425 P. 2d 773,
the Supreme Court of Utah considered the question of whether
or not a District Court Judge acted properly in dismissing
seven cases which had been appealed from City Court to District
court.

The Orders of Dismissal contained no statement of the

reason for dismissal.

In considering this issue the Court

referred to Section 77-51-4 Utah Code Annotated. The
Court held:
"Because of the nature of criminal proceedings,
and because they are in the interest of and for
the protection of the public, there is a sound basis

-4-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

in public policy for requiring the judge who assumes
the serious responsibility of dismissing a case to
set forth his reasons for doing so in order that all
may know what invokes the Court's discretion and
whether its action is justified."
The Court reversed the District Court's Order of Dimissal.
Hanson, supra at 35 and 775.

The Court cited a California

case, People v. Winters, 342 P2d 538 as authority for the
above stated proposition.

The Winters case involved a

situation where a Municipal Court Judge in Los Angeles on his
own motion and in the interest of justice, dismissed ten prosecutions for gambling initiated by the State of California.
On appeal, the Superior Court Appellate Department reversed
the dismissals.

The Court cited California Penal Code Section 1385

which is very similar to Section 77-51-4

u.c.A.

In speaking of

that section the Court said:
"Penal Code Section 1385 requires that the minute
order must set forth the reasons for dismissal. We
have not authority to disregard this requirement or
to hold that it is merely directory."
The Court further stated:
"As was said in People v. Disperat~, . . . It is to
be observed that this is no "technical" objection to
the proceedings, as the term technical is commonly
understood, but it relates to an important rule of
procedure which the Legislature has provided for the
guidance of the Courts, and the omission to observe
it cannot be held to be innocuous without an invasion
of the authority of a co-ordinate branch of the
government.
If the practice of which complaint is
made is to be continued, it is manifest that great
abuse is likely to follow, more dangerous to society
than even the acquittal of the guilty.
A judge dismissing criminal charges without trial,
upon his own motion, must record his reasons so that
all may know why this great power was exercised, and
such public declaration is indeed a purposeful restraint, lest magistial discretion sweep away the
government of laws." Winters supra at 542.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the present case the Court did not specify the reasons
for dismissal either in its order as spoken from the bench
or in the written order which it signed.

Nor is a reason

for the dismissal given in the minute entry.

It is submitted

therefore, that the Court erred in not following the procedure
set by the legislature, which must be followed.
POINT II
THE APPLICABLE FOUR YEAR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS HAD NOT EXPIRED
The facts of this case are that the criminal charges which
were filed against the defendant, were filed before the statute
of limitations had expired.

The incident giving rise to the

charge occurred on September 29, 1975.

The charge of Theft, a

Felony of the Second Degree, was filed on June 15, 1978, some
two years and nine months later and well within the applicable
four year statute of limitations provided by Section 76-1-302
U.C.A.
Section 76-1-304 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, provides that:
"The period of limitations does not
run against any defendant during any period
of time he is out of the State following
the commission of an offense."
In his Memorandum in Opposition to Sununary Disposition,
counsel for defense points out that the defendant was outside
of the State of Utah from February 19, 1977 to December 18,
1977, a period of ten months.
M~rch

It is also stated that from

of 1978 up until the time of his arrest, Mr. Loddy was

living in Colorado and then Wyoming.

The defendant was

-6-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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therefore out of the State of Utah for 13 of the 33 months
which expired between the date of the incident and the
filing of the complaint.
When the time during which the defendant was outside of
the State of Utah is accounted for, only 20 months of the
applicable four year limitation period had expired and 28
more months remained before the statute of limitations would
have expired.
POINT III
THE DEFENSE DID NOT PRODUCE EVIDENCE
AT THE HEARING ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS
WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A VIOLATION OF
HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL OR HIS
14th AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF LAW
At the hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss,
the defense asserted as the basis for the motion that the
defendant's right to due process of law had been violated by
the delay between the date the incident occurred and the date
the complaint was filed.

In his Memorandum in Opposition to

Summary Disposition, defense counsel also raised the issue
of a denial of the defendants right to a speedy trial as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Section 77-1-8

(6) U.C.A.

It is the position of the State that neither of these claims
are valid in this case.
With respect to the argument that the defendant has
been denied a speedy trial, the law is clear that that right
does not apply until one becomes an "accused".

The case

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 LEd 2d 468, 92
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S. Ct.

455, the United States Supreme Court declined to extend

the reach of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial
to the period prior to arrest.

The case is very illustrative

of the type of problem dealt with in this case.
In Marion, the facts were as follows:

The defendants-

appellees were indicted on April 21, 1970 on 19 counts alleging
that their business known as Allied Enterprises, Inc. had been
fraudulently conducted and involved misrepresentations, alteratic
of documents, and deliberate nonperformance of contracts.

The

period covered by the indictment was March 15, 1965, to February
1967; with the earliest specific act allegedly occurring on
September 3, 1965 and the latest on January 19, 1966.

The

appellees filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,
"for failure to conunence prosecution of the
alleged offenses charged therein within such time
as to afford them (their rights) to due process
of law and to a speedy trial under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States." Marion, supra at 404 U.S. 309,
30 LEd 2d 472.
No evidence was submitted, but the Court noted that from

~e

motion and the arguments of counsel it appeared that Allied
had been subject to a Federal Trade Commission cease-and-desist
order since February 6, 1967 and that the U.S. Attorney's office
was investigating Allied and other firms by October of that
same year.

The U.S. Attorney's office requested certain

Allied records, which were delivered in the summer of 1968.
The Grand Jury by which the appellees were indicted was
impaneled in September of 1969 and appellees were informed
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of the Grand Jury's concern with them in March of 1970.
indictment was then handed down in April of 1970.

The

The

appellants moved to dismiss on grounds that the indictment was returned an unreasonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the
alleged offenses.

They argued that the indictment required

them to remember specific acts and conversations which occurred
several years before.

They also argued that the delay was due

to the indifference or negligence of the U. S. Attorney in
investigating the case and presenting it to a Grand Jury.
The Court noted that no specific prejudice was claimed or
demonstrated.

The District Court dismissed the indictment

for lack of speedy prosecution and remarked that the defense
or the case must have been seriously prejudiced by the delay
of at least three years in bringing the prosecution.

On

appeal the United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissal
and addressed the Sixth Amendment speedy trial issue and
the Fifth Amendment due process issue.
With respect to the issue of whether or not the delay in
initiating the prosecution violated the a?pellees Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial the Court held that it
did not.

The Court said:

"The Sixth Amendment provides that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial. .. " On
its face, the protection of the Amendment is
activated only when a criminal prosecution has
begun and extends only to those persons who have
been "accused" in the course of that prosecution.
Those provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they

-9-
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The Due Process reasoning of the Supreme Court is applicabl1
to this case even though this case involves the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whereas the Marion case dealt
with the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
~mith,

Hibben v.

191 U.S. 310, 48 LEd 195, 24 S. Ct. 88.

In the case before the Court the defense alleges a
of the defendant's Due Process rights.

violati~

At the hearing on the

Motion to Dismiss, the only evidence presented was Mr. Van
Affadavit.

Sci~:

There was no evidence presented which in any way

demonstrated that Mr. Leddy had been prejudiced in his ability
to present a defense.

There was no evidence presented which

demonstrated an intentional delay by the State for the purpose
of gaining a tactical advantage.

There was no evidence presente'

which would indicate that the State had any intent to file
charges against the defendant until after the statement was
obtained from Mr. Holton in 1978.

The distinction must be

drawn between the passage of time and delaying by the State.
The Marion case dealt with preaccusation delay by the government.

Webster defines delay as follows:
"
1.
to put off to a future time; postpone.
2.
to make late; slow up; detain -- vi.
to stop for a while; linger ... " Websters New
World Dictionary, Second College Edition, 1974,
pp. 372.

The word delay, as can be seen, connotes some kind of
intent.

In the Marion case, the Court spoke in terms of

intentionally delaying to gain some tactical advantage.
Marion, supra 404 U.S. at 325, 30 LEd 2d at 481-82.

The record

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-12Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

here does not demonstrate that the State delayed.

What it does

show is that there was a passage of time between the incident
and the filing of the complaint.

Nor does the record show

that the State allowed the time to pass in order to gain a
tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass him.

In

short, the defense has not demonstrated either prejudice to
their ability to defend or a intentional delay by the State
to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.

There was

therefore, no basis for the Information to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
A review of the record in this case demonstrates that there
was error conunitted by the District Court on the points
presented.

The District Court did not follow the mandate of

Section 77-51-4 and state its reasons for dismissing the case
in its order, on the record or in the minutes.

Nor was there

any showing by the defense of facts which would justify the
dismissal of the case.

Neither the defendant's Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial or his Fourteenth Amendment right to
due process of law have been violated by the passage of time
in this case.

The prosecution was instituted much before the

applicable statute of limitations had expired.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I,~
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Attorneys for Appellants
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